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Abstract
Within a simple model of monetary policy for an open economy, we study how foreign ex-
change intervention may be used as a costly signal of the policy makers' objectives. Our analysis
indicates that: i) foreign exchange intervention typically stabilises the national economy, reduc-
ing the uctuations of employment and output; ii) this result is sensitive to the institutional
structure of decision-making, in that a larger stability gain is obtained when foreign exchange
intervention and monetary policy are kept under the jurisdiction of dierent governmental agen-
cies.
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1 Introduction
In a recent survey by Neely (2000) most central bankers agreed with the thesis that foreign ex-
change intervention has an impact on the market for foreign exchange. This thesis is reinforced
by some recent empirical research, notably Dominguez and Frankel (1993a, 1993b), Fischer and
Zurlinden (1999) and Payne and Vitale (2001), on the eectiveness of foreign exchange intervention,
which suggests that sterilised purchases and sales of foreign currencies on the part of central banks
inuence exchange rates. However, there is no consensus among practitioners and researchers on
what foreign exchange intervention can achieve.
In Neely's survey 47 percent of the respondents claimed that foreign exchange intervention
is aimed at resisting short-term trends, 22 percent suggested that its main goal is to eliminate
misalignements from fundamental values, while the rest indicated dierent, unspecied reasons for
intervention. Likewise, in the academic arena several theses have been suggested: foreign exchange
intervention may indicate future changes in the monetary policy (Mussa, 1981), new target levels
for the exchange rates (Bhattacharya and Weller, 1997, Vitale, 1999), and may also be used to
reduce market instability and smooth exchange rate movements (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993a).
We go beyond the analysis of the simple eects of foreign exchange intervention in the market
for foreign exchange and look at its more general macroeconomic implications. We argue that:
i) foreign exchange intervention may represent an independent instrument of policy making, as
it can be an eective channel through which policy makers can signal their objectives, reduce
agents' uncertainty on future policy decisions and hence stabilise the national economy; ii) the
institutional arrangements governing the instruments of policy making inuence such a stability
gain, for this is more pronounced when foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy fall
under the jurisdiction of two dierent governmental agencies.
To highlight the signalling role of foreign exchange intervention and present its macro-level
eects, we propose a model which combines the classical macroeconomic approach to monetary
policy with the more recent market microstructure approach to exchange rates. Indeed, a recent
popular view among researchers, notably Frankel et al. (1996), Lyons (2001) and Evans and Lyons
(2002), is that the traditional asset market approach fails to recognise the role that the structure of
the foreign exchange market, with its trading protocols and organisation, plays in the determination
of exchange rates.
In this respect our contribution oers a rst formal analysis of the interplay between the mi-
crostructure of the foreign exchange market and its macro-level implications. We propose a market
microstructure framework for the market for foreign exchange that presents two important features:
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i) it allows identication of a clear link between the intervention operations of central banks, agents'
expectations, exchange rates and employment; ii) it produces a series of testable implications which
are consistent with a large body of empirical evidence concerning the statistical relations between
intervention operations, exchange rates and monetary aggregates.
Through this market microstructure framework we are then able to analyse the macro-level
eects of foreign exchange intervention. In particular, within a monetary policy model a la Barro
and Gordon we see that the policy makers attempt to raise employment above its natural level with
unexpected monetary shocks. If individual agents are rational and fully understand the motives
of the policy makers, this attempt fails whilst an inationary bias emerges. On the other hand, if
there is incomplete information on their objectives, the policy makers might be able to stimulate
the economy or reduce the inationary bias if they can manage to manipulate agents' beliefs and
mis-represent their objectives.
Manipulating agents' beliefs may be diÆcult. In fact, precise public announcements on the
policy objectives will lack credibility, as the policy makers possess an incentive to lie, and cannot
be used. Imprecise statements can instead be credibly employed, but since dierent announcements
are per se all the same, in the sense that they are all equivalently inexpensive, multiple signals of
dierent informative quality can be used at the same time. On the contrary, we see that this
problem of the multiplicity of the equilibria does not emerge if a potentially expensive signalling
mechanism is employed. We show that foreign exchange intervention i) permits the policy makers
to obtain some degree of credibility, since the central bank stakes its own wealth in support of its
signals, and ii) delivers a uniquely informative message.
While the policy makers will try to exploit this signalling channel to mis-represent their ob-
jectives and obtain a policy gain, in equilibrium their attempt to eliminate the inationary bias
and simultaneously stimulate the domestic economy is frustrated. And yet, the policy makers will
benet from foreign exchange intervention (even though not in the way they hoped for) as this
helps to stabilise the economy by reducing the volatility of the employment level.
Our analysis also shows that in equilibrium the policy makers exploit their informational ad-
vantage and gain prots from their intervention operations. However, we see that there exists a
trade o between these prots and the stability gain foreign exchange intervention brings about.
This conclusion is reinforced when we compare dierent institutional arrangements concerning the
division of power over monetary policy and foreign exchange intervention. We nd that full coor-
dination of these two instruments of policy making will result in larger prots at the expense of a
more volatile employment level.
Therefore, a normative implication of our analysis is that foreign exchange intervention and
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monetary policy should be kept separate to reduce the instability of the economy. This is a quite
novel and important conclusion, in that the institutional arrangements governing these instruments
of policy making dier from country to country and have been completely overlooked in the existing
monetary policy literature.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present a simple model of monetary policy
for an open economy. We discuss the usual problem of time consistency and show that under
incomplete information the policy makers may benet from the manipulation of the agents' beliefs.
In section 3 we present a market microstructure analytical framework for the analysis of the foreign
exchange market. In the following section we characterise the equilibrium of the model discussing
the stabilising eects of foreign exchange intervention on the employment level. In section 5 we
extend our analysis investigating the eects of dierent institutional arrangements and considering
some comparative analysis exercises. In section 6 we propose some concluding remarks. In the
appendix we present brief proofs of the Propositions of the paper.
2 Monetary Policy in an Open Economy
We introduce a simplied model of monetary policy for an open economy as a basic set-up for the
analysis of the relation between foreign exchange intervention monetary policy, and macroeconomic
stability.
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2.1 A basic set-up
Let us consider two countries, a domestic economy and a foreign one, and the corresponding nominal
exchange rate. We assume that the nominal exchange rate reacts to monetary injections in the
home country according to the following formulation
s
t
= m
t
; (1)
where s
t
indicates the log of the nominal exchange rate between the home and foreign country, i.e.
the units of domestic currency required to purchase one unit of the foreign one, and m
t
denotes the
log of the money supply in the home country in period t. Not only can a monetary injection create
ination and depreciate the national currency, but it might also stimulate the domestic economy
increasing national employment and output. In particular, we suppose that
n
t
= m
t
  w
t
; (2)
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This model is a special case of the analytical framework proposed by Canzoneri and Henderson (1991).
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where n
t
denotes the log of the employment level and w
t
denotes the log of the nominal wage in
the domestic economy. In period t the nominal wage is negotiated before the monetary injection
takes place. The wage setters will set it equal to the expected value of the money supply,
w
t
= m
e
t
; (3)
in an attempt to stabilise the domestic employment level. Then, the domestic policy makers might
attempt to push employment beyond its natural level, normalised to 0, via unexpected monetary
shocks and ination.
As common in the monetary policy literature, we suppose that the natural level of employment
is suboptimal due to some distortion in the economy. Unexpected ination may also be desirable
per se as it guarantees a seignorage tax and reduces the cost of servicing government debt. In
practice, we suppose that there is an incentive on the part of the government to surprise the wage
setters and inate the economy. However, the policy makers also pursue the complementary goal
of stabilising the price level or, equivalently, the nominal value of the domestic currency.
In order to capture the tension between these two complementary goals we assume that in the
home country the term of oÆce of the policy makers is conned to one period and that they will
then minimise the expected value of the following loss function
L
p
= (n
1
  n)
2
+ (s
1
  s)
2
; (4)
where n and s represent optimal values for the employment level and the exchange rate.
The particular choice of the policy makers' loss function is inconsequential for the results of
our analysis. We could use alternative specications, such as those put forward by Barro and
Gordon (1983), Canzoneri (1985), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), where the nominal exchange
rate is replaced by the ination rate or the price level. The conclusions of our analysis would not
change.
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We can easily justify the particular choice we have made. Many small or developing countries,
notably Argentina, Mexico and other Latin American countries, use or have used the exchange rate
as a nominal anchor to stabilise their domestic economies. The recent experience of the European
Monetary System also suggests that even large industrialised economies have used this nominal
anchor to ght ination. Japan and the United States have also tried to target the value of the
dollar in the 1980s in order to stabilise their terms of trade.
3
Finally, United Kingdom may decide
2
It is not diÆcult to show that simple linear mappings exist between the nominal variables in Canzoneri and
Henderson's analytical framework. This means that we could easily reformulate our loss function in terms of the
price level.
3
Agenor and Montiel (1996) oer detailed accounts of the stabilisation programmes attempted in Latin America
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to join EMU in the near future. In this case the British government would probably target the
nominal exchange rate of the pound before a conversion rate were negotiated.
2.2 Incomplete information and the manipulation of agents' beliefs
When the loss function of the policy makers, L
p
, is common knowledge the values for the money
supply and the nominal wage in a discretionary equilibrium are
m
1
= w
1
= s + n; (5)
while the equilibrium value of L
p
is
L
p
= l
c
 2 n
2
: (6)
As usual, under discretion the condition of time consistency induces an inationary bias, n, whilst
the policy makers are totally unsuccessful in their attempt to raise the employment level. In this
case the policy makers would be better o if they could commit to a non-inationary policy where
the monetary supply were xed at m
1
= s. They would still be unable to stimulate the economy,
as n
1
would remain at its natural level zero, but at least the exchange rate would converge to the
target level, s.
In this context foreign exchange intervention cannot play any role, unless we consider some form
of asymmetric information. Indeed, we can claim that in general the policy makers possess various
forms of private information. This often stems from incomplete information on their preferences, as
economic agents might not know what levels of employment and ination the policy makers prefer
or there can be uncertainty on their type. For instance, in Barro (1986) and Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) agents do not know how strongly the policy makers are committed to ghting ination.
Here we follow Stein (1989) in assuming that there is incomplete information on the target level
for the exchange rate, s. In particular, we assume that the wage setters do not know the exact
value of the target level. They just know that s is drawn from a normal distribution with mean s
e
and variance  at the beginning of the term of oÆce. No uncertainty exists on the target value for
the employment level, n, while the distribution of s is common knowledge and so is the form of the
loss function.
We can justify this particular formulation of incomplete information on the basis of past expe-
rience. In fact, in the 1980s reference values were set for the exchange rates of the main currencies
in the 1970s and 1980s, while Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) discuss the anchoring of France and Italy to the German
monetary policy in the 1980s through the European ERM. Funabashi (1988) discusses the attempts of the G-5 to
target the exchange rates of the dollar, the deutsche mark and the yen in the 1980s.
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